Abstract-The effect of two different edge attacks on the robustness of random scale-free networks against cascading failure is investigated by establishing a cascading failure model for random scale-free networks. In this model, the initial load of an edge is defined as a nonlinear function of the product of the betweenness of its end nodes with an adjustable parameter, and the local preferential redistribution rule is applied to assign the broken edge's load. An interesting conclusion is reached through theoretical analyses and numerical simulations: there is a threshold of the load parameter. When the value of the load parameter is larger than this threshold, attacking the edges with the higher load can result in larger cascading failures; while for the case of the parameter value smaller than the threshold, attacking the edges with the lower load will be more likely to lead to global collapse. Furthermore, the threshold value has a close relation with the degree exponent of the network. This work will be not only helpful to protect the key edges selected effectively to resist the cascading failure, but also useful in the design of high-robustness networks in order to stand against all kinds of attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large networked systems are the basic support of modern infrastructures, such as information communication networks, the Internet, power grids and transportation networks. In network science, all these real-world networks can be illustrated by complex networks. Evidence has demonstrated that in realistic complex networks, a large influence even global collapse can be triggered by the breakdown of a few components (nodes or edges) or even a single component caused by intentional attacks or random failures through the mechanism of cascading. Typical examples are breakdowns of the Internet [1] and several large blackouts of the power grid in some countries [2] . To keep these networks' safe and stable running under any condition, cascading failures robustness of complex networks under component attacks or failures becomes a hot topic, as known that the cascading disasters directly affect the quality of people's lives and bring immeasurable economic loss to us.
Up to now, a great number of works have been devoted to exploring the cascading phenomenon in complex networks, especially in scale-free networks, and many valuable results have been found, focusing on model approaches of cascading failures [3] - [7] , effective protection and attack strategies [8] - [13] , the cascade mechanism and control measures [14] - [20] , the percolation in interdependent networks [21] , [22] , and so on. When modeling cascading fails, there are generally two ways of assigning the initial load on a component and the failed components' loads, including global and local strategies [3] , [6] . In global strategies, both the definition of the initial load and the redistribution of the failed components' loads are according to the global topological information such as the betweenness. Applying the global methods, many studies investigated cascade-based attacks and showed that scale-free networks are robust to random failures of components, but, at the same time, very fragile to intentional attacks such as the removal of the components with the highest load [8] . This phenomenon is rooted in the heterogeneity of the load distribution originating from the network structure. However, calculating the global load always needs the global information in real time, which is not readily available in a large-scale network. Therefore, considering the simplicity of the local information such as degree, many researchers adopted the local strategies to assign loads and constructed different cascading models. In fact, it may be more realistic to consider the load dynamics of the cascading phenomenon from a combined view. For example, in the Internet or the power grids, in which the normal and steady load is formed from a long time evolving, the initial load should be treated from a global view, e.g., considering the whole network topology. But when cascading failures occur, the load redistribution should be a transient action, and naturally, the load passing through a failed component will be directly redistributed among its neighbors. From this combined perspective, the authors of [7] discussed cascading behaviors of different networks. They found that the networks have the best robustness if the load of each edge is the multiplication of the betweenness of the end nodes. Their work revealed that adjusting initial load distribution can significantly improve the robustness of scale-free networks. Such "soft" protection mechanism is regarded to have practical application because it does not require the changes of network connection and capacity layout. However, they investigated the whole robustness characteristic of the networks by cutting each edge, without considering the effect of different edge failures on network vulnerability. Furthermore, most existing studies on cascading failure robustness of scale-free networks are based on Barabá si and Albert (BA) model, but they are not conformed to the real network because the degree exponent of the BA model is a constant.
In the present work, we follow the research of [7] by considering a new cascading model for random scale-free networks, wherein the cascading process is triggered by two different attacks on network edges, namely attacking the edges with the highest load and with the lowest load. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II, we describe the cascading model of a random scale-free network in detail. In Sec. III, we discuss the effect of the model parameters on network robustness by the theoretical analysis and simulation. Finally, some summaries and conclusions are stated in Sec. IV.
The model It has been proposed that many real-world networks show power-law degree distribution, and are termed as scale-free. There are many models which reproduce such scale-free features. BA model is the well-known one of them, in which the degree exponent  of the produced network is constant 3. Actually, for most real networks, the  is varying values, which has turned out to be sensitive to the detail of network structure [23] . Thus, we consider the random scale-free network [24] as the physical infrastructure in which a cascading process takes place. The network starts as N nodes, which are indexed by an integer i (    . In the present work, the total network size is fixed as 200 N = and the parameter is set to be 2 m = (hence the mean degree 24 km < >= = [24] ). With the random scale-free networks at hand, let us define the cascading model based on edge failure. As is known, in real-world networks, complex networks generally transport load flow closely related to our daily life. Under normal circumstances, such flow keeps a balanced state as a result of a long time evolving, and the system maintains its normal and efficient functioning. However, due to either random breakdowns or intentional attacks, the failures of some edges may cause loads to redistribute among other edges in the network, which may trigger more edges' failure and even entire collapse of the network.
Inspired by the above consideration, we assume the initial load of an edge ij before attack to be
where 0   is an adjustable parameter and controls the distribution of the initial load, and i B and j B are the betweenness of nodes i and j , respectively. The betweenness of a node i is defined as follows:
where st  is the number of shortest paths from the node s to node t and () st i  is the number of these shortest paths making use of node i . Compared with the widely-used betweenness, the definition of this generalized betweenness considers the two end points of each shortest path, and thus avoiding the possibility that some edges may bear no loads at all. At the same time, the ranking of edge betweenness centrality keeps the same. From (1), we can see that the load on an edge has a power-law dependence on the product of betweenness of its two end nodes. This is supported by empirical evidence of real networks [7] . As an example, when a data packet is sent from one position to another through scale-free networks such as the Internet, the links between central points of high betweenness are more probable to be chosen because it can be efficient to get to the destination along them.
As every edge has some limited capacity determining the load-carrying ability which is generally constrained by cost, it is reasonable to assume that the capacity i C of edge ij is proportional to its initial load, that is
where 0   is a tolerance parameter, which guarantees that initially there are no overloaded edges. Obviously, the bigger  is, the more ability the edges possess to handle the extra load, but the higher building the network costs. Therefore, there should be explored to build the strong robustness network against cascading failure with the minimum cost.
Here we focus on cascades triggered by a small attack, e.g., removal of a single edge. The load flow along the broken edge will be redistributed to the other edges in the network. Different from the load global redistribution rule, considering that the load redistribution is a transient action, the load on the failed edge must pass its nearest-neighbor edge. So the load local preferential redistribution rule is applied [6] . 
where i  and j  are the sets of neighboring nodes of i and j , respectively. This rule for the load redistribution is based on the observation in real-world networks like the Internet. If a line fails, it is reasonable to preferentially reroute traffic along those higher-capacity edges to avoid further congestions.
In this scheme, for a neighbor im of the edge ij , if
then the edge im will break apart, inducing further redistribution of its load of im im LL  according to (4) and potentially more edges might break. Cascading failure continues as long as there is an edge whose load exceeds its capacity.
In previous studies, there are generally two cascade-based attacking strategies: random attack and intentional attack. The former is to attack some randomly chosen components. The latter is to attack the important components, which are usually considered to be the ones with the highest load. Undoubtedly, if a network is robust under intentional attacks, it will be capable of withstanding all of the attacks. Since scale-free networks are robust to random attack but fragile to intentional attack, a critical question is that how to choose the important components to execute the intentional attack, or is it always more influential for the network to attack its components with the higher load than the ones with the lower load. 
CF
, the stronger the robustness of the network against cascading failure.
II. ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION RESULTS
Based on the mechanism of load redistribution in the cascading model, when the edge ij fails, to avoid the emergence of cascading failure, the following condition should be satisfied:
According to the definitions of im L and im L D , the above (6) can be rewritten as:
In the cascading process, an edge' load will be undoubtedly greater than its initial load, that is:
By inserting (8) into (7), we can get () According to the knowledge of degree and probability, we know
where min k and max k are the minimum and the maximum node degrees, and ' () i P k k is the conditional probability that a node of i k has a neighbor of ' k . Since most scale-free networks such as random scale-free networks in the present work have no degree-degree correlation, ' ' '
Based on (13) and (14), (11) can be expressed by: According to (10) , for scale-free networks, (17) is rewritten as:
In order to prevent large-scale cascading failures, (18) must be satisfied. According to [24] and [25] Similarly, when 1 0 1
attacking the edges with the higher initial load or the lower initial load makes no difference, so the threshold is 1 1
As to the value of  for different scale-free networks with the degree parameter  , [24] and [25] Next, for better understanding the cascading phenomenon and verifying the above analytic results, extensive simulation tests are performed using MATLAB.
According to our cascading model, different random scale-free networks with total size 200 N = and average degree 4 k < >= can be constructed. Then, the effect of  and  on the robustness of random scale-free networks under the HL and the LL attacking strategies is investigated. For each strategy, 8 edges are chosen as the attacked objects. Considering the effect of the difference of the network topologies generated by the random scale-free model on simulation results, every curve in the following is obtained by averaging over experiments on 20 independent networks. In the cascading model, for a given value of g , the bigger the value  , the higher the heterogeneity of the load distribution. Therefore, first fixing 3   , we focus on the effect of the load parameter  on the robustness against cascading failure. , the strength of the heterogeneity of the distribution of the load makes the edges with the higher load more important. These are consistent with previous studies that attacking the components with the highest load can bring the most serious damage to the network [3] , [4] , [8] , [17] , which is a special case of our model.
In addition, as the value  increases, another interesting observation is that the HL curves and the LL curves have the trend of getting closer in Fig. 1 corresponds to the theoretical estimate obtained. At this threshold, the effect on the network is almost the same for the HL and the LL attacks, in other words, the network preserves its robustness against the HL and the LL attacks. 
III. CONCLUSIONS
Cascading failures triggered by a small initial attack can do great harms to complex networks, especially to the infrastructure networks. Protecting the network against cascading failure under all kinds of attacks is particularly important. In this article, the factors affecting robustness of random scale-free networks against cascading failure under edge-based initial attacks are studied. A model of the random scale-free network for cascading failure is constructed based on a function of the betweenness and control parameter  . According to the random scale-free network whose degree exponent is adjusted, the network robustness for cascading failure is investigated. The analytic results and the numerical simulations both show that: there exists a threshold c  .
On the one hand, when c   , attacking the edges with the highest load certainly works more efficient. On the other hand, when c   , as unexpected, attacking the edges with the lowest load is more harmful. Moreover, the degree exponent of the network significantly affects the value of c  . Such interesting and enlightening phenomenon indicates that the load and degree distributions must be taken into account to determine the "critical" edges in order to protect them to prevent large-scale cascading failures. Our studies also provide a basis to design high robustness random scale-free network by the reasonably distributing loads among the network according to the node betweenness, which can effectively resist all kinds of edge attacks in future.
